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Abstract: 
This article examines the process, causes and repercussions of the accession of 
Taiwan, as a contested state, together with China, to the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation in 1991, the first inter-governmental organization that Taipei has joined 
since 1971. Based on an analysis of elite interviews, primary and secondary data, the 
paper traces the under-explored diplomatic history. It argues that changes in Taiwan’s 
domestic and external environments as well as during the diplomatic process have 
accounted for Taipei’s admission, instead of the China factor alone. The four positive 
effects of accession on Taiwan’s international space are explored, as are the 
implications of the study for Taiwan’s continuous survival as a contested state. By 
undertaking a nuanced analysis of an important yet under-studied milestone in the 
contested state’s struggle to mitigate international isolation, the article sheds light on 
the study of Taiwan’s external ties amid the sovereignty dispute between Taipei and 
Beijing. 
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Introduction 
 
After 1949, both the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) strove to win recognition and legitimacy from the 
international community. In 1971, Taiwan lost its seat in the United Nations, 
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becoming what Deon Geldenhuys describes as a contested state.1 Contested states 
constitute anomalies in the conventional inter-state system as they often lack 
sufficient international recognition.2  Although some of them have demonstrated a 
certain degree of statehood by viably ruling their domestic constituents and showing 
domestic sovereignty, 3  the international community challenges their purported 
statehood. 4  Examples of contested states include Palestine, Kosovo, Taiwan, and 
Transnistria. Since 1971, Taiwan has received de jure recognition from a minority of 
confirmed states, lacked sufficient international legal sovereignty,5 and had limited 
participation in inter-governmental organizations (IGOs).6 However, it has achieved 
domestic sovereignty by effectively controlling events within its borders. Moreover, it 
has expanded its functional ties with a majority of confirmed states and used its 
economic power to win some degree of international recognition, thereby mitigating 
its level of isolation as compared to that of other contested states.7 Kosovan and 
Transnistrian officials have even regarded Taiwan as an example to follow.8  
This paper presents the findings of original research on an important yet under-
explored case of Taiwan’s admission to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) in 1991.9 It moves beyond a state-centric analytical framework to explore 
how and why APEC became the first IGO that Taipei joined as a contested state, 
despite Beijing’s initial opposition. The first enlargement of APEC took place in Seoul 
in November 1991, two years after its formation, with Taiwan, the PRC, and Hong 
Kong (the so-called Three Chinas) admitted as new members. By including three 
economies that had strong regional links, APEC strengthened its “stature as the single 
largest forum speaking on the subject of trade liberalization.” 10  Although APEC 
accession was a milestone in Taipei’s struggle as a contested state, it has not been 
thoroughly examined in the scholarly literature. This paper fills the void by explaining 
the process, causes and repercussions of the accession through original research. 
In terms of methodology, a qualitative single case study approach was adopted 
for this study because of the paucity of existing knowledge about the chosen area of 
study.11 This approach allows the researcher to focus on marshalling facts in order to 
                                                          
1 Geldenhuys 2009. 
2 Ibid; Berg and Toomla 2009. 
3 Krasner 1999, 2001. 
4 Geldenhuys 2009; Ker-Lindsay 2012, 19-20. 
5 Krasner 1999, 2001. 
6 Cho 2005; Wang 2006; Chang 2010. 
7 For Taiwan’s evolving status in the international system, see  Yahuda 1996; Hickey 2007; Fell 2012, 
151-170. 
8 Ker-Lindsay 2012, 19-20; Ignatiev 2012. 
9 In June 1989, Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke called for the establishment of a more formal 
intergovernmental vehicle of regional co-operation resulting in the birth of APEC. See Hawke 1989, 
1994, 431; Funabashi 1995, 58-61.  
10 Hoon 1991. 
11 Gerring 2004. 
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offer a holistic description of the complex case in question and to retain the 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events.12 Research methods included in-depth 
interviews, and the collection of primary and secondary materials. 13  Major 
interviewees included American and Taiwanese officials and business leaders 
involved in the diplomacy leading up to Taiwan’s accession. Library research was 
carried out in the US, Taiwan and Mainland China. 
The paper is composed of four sections. After the introduction, the second 
section uses the method of process tracing14 to detail the pertinent diplomatic history, 
highlighting the key events and multiple players of state and non-state capacity. The 
third section argues that a combination of factors emanating from changes in Taiwan’s 
domestic and external environments as well as from the diplomatic process has 
accounted for Taipei’s diplomatic breakthrough. Taiwan’s domestic changes, namely 
its economic success and the pursuit of pragmatic diplomacy as a new foreign policy 
initiative, were assets for its APEC admission. Externally, Beijing’s post-1978 
economic reforms and the Tiananmen Incident were also conducive to Taiwan’s 
accession. Moreover, the bottom-up approach to regionalism prior to APEC allowed 
Taiwanese business elites to utilize their accumulated connections within regional 
non-governmental organization (NGO) networks to lobby for Taiwan’s membership to 
compensate for the handicapped formal channels of diplomacy stemming from 
Taipei’s status as a contested state. During the diplomatic process, decisions by APEC 
to define members as economies and to simultaneously admit the Three Chinas 
further facilitated Taipei’s entry. So did the convergence of interests among pertinent 
multiple players. Eventually, creative formulae were found resulting in Taiwan’s 
accession. The final section discusses the four positive effects of accession on 
Taiwan’s position as a contested state and the implications of the study for Taipei’s 
continuous survival as a contested state. 
 
Diplomatic Process of Taiwan’s Accession 
 
The diplomatic process leading up to APEC’s first enlargement comprised the 
pre-negotiation phase from early 1989 to the July 1990 Singapore meeting and the 
negotiation period from October 1990 to October 1991. The enlargement issue was 
problematic for APEC because of Taipei’s sovereignty dispute with Beijing. 
According to Richard H. Solomon, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
                                                          
12 Yin 1994, 2. 
13 Interviews were carried out in 1997, 1998, 2013, 2014 and 2015. While interviews can help correct 
distortions in primary and secondary materials, the use of the latter can compensate for the weaknesses 
of the former. See Tansey 2007. 
14 Process tracing enables us to examine multiple interaction effects, “where it is difficult to explain 
outcomes in terms of two or three independent variables.” See George and Bennett 2005, 206. 
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and Pacific Affairs, “The issue was constant. That is, would China agree to it 
[Taiwan’s admission to IGOs]? Then there would be negotiations on the language – 
how would Taiwan be described?”15 The diplomacy leading to enlargement, however, 
was far more complicated than what Solomon had described. 
 
Pre-negotiation Period 
 
Before the formal negotiations, a number of actors had worked for or against 
Taiwan’s entry. They included the Australian, American and Chinese governments, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, the Taiwanese state and 
non-state actors. 
Before APEC’s inception, Taiwan’s private sector elites had started lobbying for 
Taipei’s membership. In April 1989, heavyweight Taiwanese businessman C.F. Koo 
辜振甫 met the Australian envoy Richard Woolcott during the meeting of a regional 
NGO, namely the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), in San Francisco, 
arguing that Taipei’s designation would not become a problem so long as it could join 
the regime.16  
Australia initially sought the inclusion of Three Chinas,17 but later decided to 
defer the issue. In March and April 1989, Woolcott consulted the opinions of proposed 
APEC members on the issue.18 He concluded that “most countries believed that China 
should become a participant, as well as Taiwan and Hong Kong, as major regional 
economies, if the difficulties surrounding their status could be overcome.”19 On 15 
May, the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gareth Evans expressed Canberra’s 
desire to involve Taiwan in the regime: “Because of the importance of the Taiwanese 
economy and its links with other regional economies, we would also like to see 
Taiwan – although recognized by most potential participants as part of the PRC– 
associated in some way with the initiative.”20  
In May, Woolcott met with the Chinese Premier Li Peng 李鵬, Foreign Minister 
Qian Qichen 錢其琛 and the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Li 
Lanqing 李嵐清 in Beijing.21 China insisted that if the meeting were to be held at a 
formal, intergovernmental level, only sovereign states should participate, not Taiwan 
and Hong Kong.22 Subsequently, Woolcott deferred the issue. 
                                                          
15 Interview with Richard H. Solomon, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, Washington DC, 1 April 1998. 
16 Interview with a Taiwanese participant in the meeting, Taipei, 28 October 1997.  
17 Far Eastern Economic Review, 1989. “Unspecific Pacific,” 144 (19), 20. 
18 These included New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN member states. 
19 Woolcott 1994.  
20 Evans 1989; Evans and Grant 1991, 126. 
21 Woolcott 1994.  
22 Funabashi 1995, 65. 
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In Washington DC, Woolcott met US officials and regional NGO leaders to 
discuss membership issues.23 The focus was to establish APEC on a “six plus six” 
formula, with six ASEAN countries “counterweighted” by six non-ASEAN members 
in order to allow APEC to get off the ground and to assure ASEAN of its central role 
in the regime. 
According to Robert Zoellick, the then State Department Counsellor, the 
immediate membership of Three Chinas would hinder the US objective of getting 
APEC off the ground.24 Furthermore, this formula was to convince ASEAN of its key 
role in the creation of APEC.  From the outset, ASEAN members were ambivalent 
about the participation of the three Chinese economies.25 Some declined to include 
China without Hong Kong and Taiwan fearing that ASEAN’s collective voice would 
be muted.26 Others were suspicious of Taiwan, dreading that the latter’s friendly ties 
with Washington would threaten ASEAN’s position.27 
In Washington DC, Woolcott gave an American member of the Pacific Basin 
Economic Council (PBEC), another regional NGO, the briefing papers on the 
Australian initiative. On 24 May, these papers were sent to Koo, the then-deputy 
international president of PBEC. Given Koo’s close relations with the Taiwanese 
authorities in his capacity as a member of the Central Standing Committee of the 
ruling Kuomintang, these papers must have reached the Taiwanese government.28  
After Woolcott’s second-round trip came the Tiananmen Incident on 4 June 
1989, which resulted in Beijing’s temporary diplomatic isolation. Tiananmen helped 
the initiators of APEC confirm the existing consensus to start APEC on a “six plus 
six” basis. On 7 July, the US Secretary of State James Baker stressed that China-
Taiwan issue was a political problem of long standing, so Washington preferred 
getting APEC established on a “six plus six” formula.29 
By this time, the exclusion of Taiwan from the inaugural regime was ensured. 
The major causes were Beijing’s opposition to Taipei’s membership, the consensus on 
starting APEC with a smaller grouping of twelve, and ASEAN’s apprehension of a 
possible weakening of its position due to the Three Chinas’ immediate inclusion. 
Tiananmen created a revulsion against Beijing but did not cause the exclusion of the 
                                                          
23 Australian Background 1989; a private correspondence between an American PBEC participant and 
his Taiwanese counterpart, 24 May 1989; interview, Richard H. Solomon. 
24 Telephone interview with Robert Zoellick, former State Department Counsellor, Washington DC, 1 
April 1998. Also see interview, Richard H. Solomon. 
25 Bonnor 1990, 61. 
26 Funabashi 1995, 65. 
27 Koo 1989.  
28
 Woolcott’s visit to Taipei  was not included in his published official itinerary. Interview with C. K. 
Chang, an economist involved in the diplomatic process from a think tank run by Koo’s conglomerate, 
Taipei, 28 October 1997.  
29 Baker 1989. 
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three from the 1989 meeting. In September, a Senior Official Meeting (SOM) in 
Sydney decided that the three entities would not be admitted to the inaugural meeting. 
However, Taiwan continued lobbying for membership. In the September PECC 
meeting in New Zealand, Koo argued that since PECC had decided to support APEC, 
PECC should demand Canberra invite all the PECC member countries, including 
Taiwan, to the meeting.  
Meanwhile, Taiwan was offered some conciliatory arrangements to allow it to be 
“associated” with the inaugural meeting. As Frederick Chien 錢復, Taiwan’s then 
foreign minister recalled, “We were allowed to send one or two people to Australia so 
as to establish contacts with APEC delegations outside the formal meeting.”30 The 
Taiwanese delegation included Tzu-dan Wu 吳子丹, C.F. Koo, and C.K. Chang 張錦
崑.31 Wu was a career diplomat. Koo was the deputy international president of PBEC. 
Chang was an economist from Koo’s think tank. Only Koo was formally invited to the 
APEC opening banquet because of his position in PBEC.32 
By utilizing his connections established in regional NGOs since 1969, Koo 
collected information for Taipei and lobbied for Taiwan’s membership by meeting 
officials and his NGO counterparts during the 1989 meeting. On 5 November, he met 
Japanese and South Korean ministers, and the Indonesian PECC representative Jusuf 
Wanandi. He also phoned Richard H. Solomon seeking American support. During the 
banquet, Koo lobbied the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Hawke, the Australian 
Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, as well as the Singaporean representative Lee Hsien 
Loong for Taiwan’s membership. According to Evans, Beijing had criticized Canberra 
for having invited Koo to the banquet, and refused to send the Chinese ambassador to 
Australia and the Chinese PECC delegate to the event. Some participants expressed 
their support for Taipei while suggesting that Taiwan should work out a feasible 
formula.33 
On 7 November, APEC members discussed the enlargement issue. The positive 
attitudes of South Korea, Japan and Canada were countered by ASEAN’s 
reservations, reaching no conclusion on enlargement. 
In March 1990, the first SOM in Singapore concluded that on this issue it would 
be necessary to proceed by consensus despite internal discord over the question of 
timing and modalities.34 The second SOM in May addressed the former issue by 
establishing the principle of simultaneous participation, with still no resolution on the 
                                                          
30 Interview with Frederick Chien, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taipei, 24 October 1997.  
31 Interview, C. K. Chang; Koo 1989; Huang, Shuling. 1991. “Guzhenfu yu Yataijinghehui” (C.F. Koo 
and APEC), Lianhe bao, 30 September. 
32 Interview with Richard H. Fairbanks, the then President of PECC, Washington DC, 3 April 1998. 
33 Koo 1989. 
34 APEC1990a. 
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latter.35 
Disagreement over enlargement continued during the first few days of the second 
APEC ministerial meeting in July. While some ASEAN members considered the 
inclusion premature, others willed their entry to take place as soon as possible.36 
However, a breakthrough emerged during a five-hour lunch attended by heads of 
delegation only.37 Members agreed that consultations should proceed with the three 
economies with a view to reaching modalities acceptable to all parties involved for 
the simultaneous participation of the three as soon as possible.38 Furthermore, the 
decision making involved would be a “collective process,” in which the consultations 
would be referred back to the ministers at APEC that would reach a consensus on the 
final inclusion of the three.39 
Behind this decision laid a complex political drama. First, Taiwan’s effort to 
lobby for its inclusion continued, with its state and non-state actors working before, 
during and after the Singapore meeting.40 As one participant recalled, “Taiwan’s role 
at that point was lobbying different delegations.”41 In contrast, Beijing reiterated its 
refusal to allow Taiwan and Hong Kong to become members because “they are 
territories.”42 
Second, Washington continuously tried to resolve the enlargement issue. State 
Department officials kept contact with Seoul, the designated host of 1991 APEC, and 
worked closely with the Taipei representative in Washington DC, Mao-shih Ding 丁
懋時. Taipei and Washington agreed that Seoul should take the lead in negotiating 
with Beijing. Washington viewed Seoul as a less difficult negotiating partner for the 
Chinese than the US would be. If Washington worked as a mediator, issues about its 
Taiwan policy would have become part of the discussion, further complicating the 
negotiation. Concurrently, America knew that Seoul was willing to undertake such a 
project and had confidence in the skill of the person chosen to undertake the 
mediation, Lee See-young. As Robert Fauver recalled, “Once America had made that 
determination to get the Koreans to work in the front, the US delegation worked 
behind the scenes during the surroundings of the meetings and Baker worked on the 
agreement at the lunch itself.”43 
The third point involved the wording of the July agreement and ASEAN 
                                                          
35 APEC 1990b. 
36  “No consensus on whether to admit China, Taiwan and HK,” Straits Times, 31 July 1990. 
37 Interview with Robert Fauver, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, Washington DC, 1 April 1998. 
38 APEC 1990c; Youngblood 1990. 
39 Solomon 1990a; Youngblood 1990. 
40 Interviews, C. K. Chang and Robert Fauver. 
41 Interview, Robert Fauver. 
42 Youngblood 1990. 
43 Interview, Robert Fauver. 
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members. As one participant observed, “Technically it allowed ASEAN to say ‘we 
have not yet agreed’ but it got the process going to see if there would be a solution… 
So they still had a chance to say ‘no’ even though the process had started.”44 From 
Washington’s standpoint, to maintain ASEAN’s comfort level was important for 
APEC, and “to maintain that comfort level was critical to answer the Three Chinas’ 
question.”45 
 
Formal Negotiations 
 
Following the July 1990 agreement, consultations kick-started with Seoul as the 
mediator and Beijing and Taipei as the negotiating parties concerned. Behind the 
scene was the “silent but active bystander” – America.46 Once the formal negotiations 
began, the key players became diplomats from Seoul, Taipei, Beijing and Washington. 
Taiwanese non-state actors moved into the background. 
Nine rounds of negotiations took place from October 1990 to October 1991. 
Taiwan negotiated with Korea alone three times; the rest of the negotiations were 
conducted between Korea and Taiwan and Korea and China in a “simultaneous but 
non-overlapping” manner. There was no face-to-face negotiation between Beijing and 
Taipei. Locations of negotiations ranged from Beijing, Taipei, Seoul, Washington DC, 
to New York.47 
In October 1990, the Taiwanese negotiator Tzu-dan Wu set out Taipei’s position 
in Seoul.48 In January 1991, Lee embarked on his mission to incorporate the three 
entities into APEC. From 19 to 23 August, crucial negotiations took place in Seoul, 
with Korea proposing a compromise plan concerning Taipei’s designation in APEC.49 
However, no agreement emerged until the August SOM meeting in Kyongju. 
“Lee received the news by phone of Taipei’s acceptance when he was chatting with 
Bob Fauver in his hotel room, who congratulated him on the breakthrough,” wrote 
Yoichi Funabashi in his account of the negotiation.50 APEC members then endorsed 
the secret Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) which set out the terms for the 
enlargement, and announced the Three Chinas’ participation in the November 
ministerial meeting.51 
In late September in New York, the final agreement on the wording of the Korea-
                                                          
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Chang 1991; interview with John Chang, the then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taipei, 24 March 
2015. 
48 Yin 1991.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Funabashi 1995, 74. 
51 APEC 1991. 
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PRC MOU and the Korea-ROC MOU was reached at midnight on the morning that 
the Chinese foreign minister was due to leave. On 2 October, the Korea-PRC MOU 
was signed. On 15 October, the Korea-ROC MOU was signed concluding the 
pertinent negotiations. 
It is noteworthy that Washington had continued to work behind the scenes trying 
to find a solution. As Fauver recalled, “During the discussions, from the beginning to 
the end, we talked to all participants on a number of different occasions, trying to 
move all sides towards the middle.”52 Furthermore, Washington continued to express 
its support for Lee and the proposed enlargement.53 As Fauver noted, “All three sides 
knew that they could not split us from See-young. That was important to the 
process.” 54  During the US-Korea summit on 2 July, US president George Bush 
supported the enlargement.55  
Once the negotiations started, thorny questions pertaining to the sovereignty 
dispute between Beijing and Taipei were brought to the negotiation table. They 
involved issues ranging from the timing of membership, the name of participants, the 
level of representation, the ministries of representation, to the future hosting of APEC 
meetings. Procedural questions were also negotiated, such as who would enter the 
door first, and whether there would be the use of national flags.56 
As Lee recalled, the two sides were initially “far apart and compromise seemed 
elusive,”57 with both merely agreeing not to use flags in the meetings, a consensus 
already reached when APEC was established. 
Besides, the contrasting focus of the two sides loomed large, with Taiwan 
concerned about substance while Beijing concentrated on process. “Taiwan was 
interested in the substance of APEC first and the process second. My foreign ministry 
friends in Taiwan understood the longer-term interest was more on the substantive 
benefits of APEC than on the diplomatic benefits… Conversely, for Beijing, the focus 
was on process first, process second and process third, with a focus on substance 
coming in last,” observed an involved American official.58 On the issue of timing, for 
example, Beijing initially suggested that the PRC should be the first to be admitted, 
with the right to veto new applicants.59 Others, however, insisted on the simultaneous 
admission of all three in accordance with a prior principle established by APEC. 
Taipei’s designation was a sticking point in negotiations. Both sides were 
initially far apart on this topic. Taiwan first put its official name “ROC” on the table, 
                                                          
52 Interview, Robert Fauver. 
53 Solomon 1990b; “Fact Sheet: APEC.” 1991. 
54 Interview, Robert Fauver. 
55 Solomon 1991; interview, Frederick Chien. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Funabashi 1995, 73. 
58 Interview, Robert Fauver. 
59 Interview, Richard H. Solomon. 
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but it was rejected by the PRC. Beijing demanded that Taipei agree to enter APEC as 
a province of China by using names including “Taipei-China” or “Taiwan-China.”60 
Taiwan disagreed. Also presented on the table were the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) model and the formulation proposed in General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) discussions.61 While Taipei intended to choose a name that would not 
imply the inclusion of Taiwan as part of the PRC, Beijing preferred names implying a 
lack of Taiwan’s independence from the Mainland. 62  Eventually, Lee put forth 
“Chinese Taipei,” known as the Olympic model,63 on the table, and both sides agreed. 
Equally thorny was the protracted question of who would represent Taipei in 
APEC. Taipei initially insisted on sending its foreign minister to APEC meetings on 
an equal footing vis-à-vis Beijing, but Beijing disagreed. Subsequently, Taiwan agreed 
that only its ministers in charge of APEC-related economic affairs shall attend the 
meetings, not its foreign minister nor vice foreign minister. However, the Taipei 
delegation could include officials of foreign and other ministries at or below the level 
of department directors. 64  As Chien explained, “Foreign ministers attend APEC 
mainly to conduct private bilateral talks outside the formal meetings, whereas APEC 
is a forum to discuss issues of non-political nature. So whether our foreign minister 
attends APEC would not influence our main interest… Because APEC discusses trade 
matters, we insist on the participation of our minister of economic affairs. We have to 
be treated as an equal in this regard.”65 
 
Factor Analysis 
 
Arguably, Taipei successfully joined APEC because of a combination of factors 
emanating from Taiwan’s external and domestic environments as well as from the 
diplomatic process. The external environment focuses on the trend of regionalism and 
the China factor, whereas the domestic environment refers to political and economic 
changes at home. 
  
External and Domestic Changes 
 
The first external factor refers to the shift in regionalism in the Asia-Pacific 
region. For nearly three decades prior to APEC’s inception, regionalism was 
                                                          
60 Chang 1991, 332; Funabashi 1995, 74. 
61 Chang 1991, 315; interview, Robert Fauver. For the ADB model, see  Hsieh 1994; Deng 1997, 72; 
interview with Samuel Hsieh, former ADB staff member , Taipei, 4 November 1997. 
62 Interview, Robert Fauver; Chang 1991, 332. 
63 Chan 1985. 
64 Funabashi 1995, 74-75. 
65 Interview, Frederick Chien. 
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characterized by a bottom-up approach with a strong societal involvement because of 
deepening regional economic interaction.  The formation of APEC, however, 
signalled the shift towards state-led economic regionalism, driven by a sense of 
economic insecurity among members involved in the face of a multilateral trading 
system under threat.  
The shift towards state-led economic regionalism created problems for Taiwan’s 
accession because of Taipei’s status as a contested state. While Taiwan’s business 
leaders had deepened connections with their regional counterparts and influences in 
regional NGOs, its state actor was unable to join the inaugural IGO in 1989. 
However, the long-standing bottom-up development of regionalism created 
opportunities for Taiwan’s accession because it enabled Taiwanese business leaders to 
take part in regional NGOs thereby deepening ties with their regional counterparts. 
They utilized these NGOs as platforms of diplomacy to help Taipei’s bid for APEC 
membership in pursuit of national interests. Because of Taiwan’s contested statehood, 
these informal diplomatic channels became important in partly alleviating Taipei’s 
isolation for the sake of gaining APEC membership. 
The second external factor refers to China’s domestic transition, namely the 
Tiananmen Incident and Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms after 1978. 
Some contend that the Tiananmen Incident led to the exclusion of the three 
Chinese economies from the inaugural APEC meeting; but for the Incident China 
would have been invited to Canberra in 1989, which might have created more 
obstacles for Taiwan’s entry.66 However, this explanation is problematic in that the 
exclusion of the three entities from the Canberra meeting primarily resulted from a 
consensus to start APEC with a smaller grouping, and such a consensus predated the 
Incident. As Fauver argued, “I don’t think it (Tiananmen) affected the membership 
question or the timing of the membership question.”67 
However, the Incident indirectly influenced Taiwan’s accession. With its strategic 
position lessened by East-West détente in the late 1980s and its international 
reputation damaged because of Tiananmen, China suffered a severe blow in its 
international importance and its bargaining power vis-à-vis relevant parties regarding 
Taipei’s accession weakened accordingly. Furthermore, the Incident challenged the 
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime. To make up for 
legitimization deficits, Beijing aspired to improve its foreign ties so as to restore its 
great-power status and to regain its international acceptance.68 Although hard-liners 
became dominant after the massacre, the CCP would still have to pursue an open-door 
policy in order to sustain economic growth, which would be central to regime 
                                                          
66 Bonnor 1990, 60; Yin 1991. 
67 Interview, Robert Fauver. 
68 Kim 1995, 466. 
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legitimacy. Hence, friendly relations with the West were deemed important. The 
aftermath of Tiananmen thus reinforced China’s desire for its membership of APEC. 
Given APEC’s preference for Taipei’s accession, Beijing had to make concessions on 
Taiwan’s admission during the negotiations that began months after Tiananmen in 
order to make its own accession possible.  
Deng’s post-1978 economic reforms 69 comprised the expansion of trade and the 
encouragement of foreign investment. China’s link with the international economy 
deepened, especially in the Asia-Pacific region,70 and Beijing decided to embrace 
international economic organizations including APEC. 71  These changes were 
conducive to Taiwan’s APEC membership because China consequently saw multiple 
economic interests in its APEC accession. The membership could help Beijing 
manage its relations with pertinent market-oriented economies, engage itself in certain 
economic rule-making, seek foreign resources for economic co-operation, and pursue 
trade liberalization. APEC’s aim to save a shaky multilateral trading system further 
matched China’s interest as a growing trading power. Because China’s willingness to 
join APEC was strong for the aforementioned political and economic considerations, 
it could not afford to be excluded. Hence the principle of simultaneous participation 
enhanced the cost of Beijing’s initial move to block Taipei’s membership.  
Taiwan’s domestic transition in the late 1980s further created opportunities for its 
APEC membership. Politically, the move towards pragmatic diplomacy after 1988 
was conducive to accession because Taipei was no longer constrained by the zero-sum 
rationale that had dictated its strategy towards IGO membership. Economically, 
Taiwan’s trade liberalization reinforced its preference for joining APEC and Taiwan’s 
increasing economic regional links through overseas investment, 72  intra-regional 
trade, and technology transfers enhanced its desirability by APEC. Because the 
formation of APEC was driven by an urgent regional need to establish a grouping in 
order to secure an open trading system, Taiwan attracted APEC because its 
accumulated economic power could enhance the collective strength of the regime. 
This demonstrates that the well-documented economic statecraft was functioning. 
Taiwan’s economic clout further facilitated the active engagement in regional NGOs 
by its business leaders, which, in turn, contributed to Taiwan’s bid. 
 
Effects of the Decisions by APEC 
 
                                                          
69 Shirk 1996. 
70 Hartland-Thunberg 1990, 55-62; Lardy 1994, 71. 
71 Deng 1997. 
72 In 1989, Taiwan’s investment ranked second in the Philippines. In 1990, Taiwan was the number one 
foreign investor in Malaysia. See Cheng 1992, 42. 
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Enabling factors emanating from the diplomatic process included two decisions 
by APEC prior to negotiations. The first was to define APEC as an organization 
composed of “economies” rather than “states.” The second referred to the principle of 
simultaneous participation. Arguably, these rules were the accommodations APEC 
made in order to facilitate Taiwan’s inclusion because the IGO regarded Taiwan, 
despite its contested statehood, as an asset to the nascent regime due to its economic 
power. 
Each rule influenced the negotiations as follows. The first decision, made in 
1989, aimed to make the involvement of Taiwan (and Hong Kong) possible. 73 
Specifically, the rule was to bypass the issue of statehood and sovereignty that had 
irritated Beijing over Taipei’s IGO membership, thereby minimizing the emergence of 
political disputes in negotiations on enlargement. 
The second principle of simultaneous participation, as argued earlier, constrained 
Beijing’s freedom of action to block Taipei’s inclusion. If the PRC blocked Taiwan’s 
membership, it would be concurrently excluded as well.74 Once the price of exclusion 
became too high because of its aforementioned interests, Beijing had to accept this 
rule in order to join the regime.   
 
Concessions by Beijing and Taipei amid APEC Incentives  
 
Another enabling factor from the diplomatic process resulted from concessions 
made by Taipei and Beijing partially because of perceived incentives offered by 
APEC membership. As William Habeeb argues, “All negotiations involve concessions 
and all successful negotiations involve convergence.” 75  Both parties made 
concessions during the negotiations, finally reaching a convergent point from their 
initially disparate positions over Taiwan’s membership.  Because perceived political 
and economic incentives offered by APEC made the price of exclusion exceedingly 
costly, concessions became desirable. 
For Beijing, its major concession was to consent to Taiwan’s membership, 
agreeing to a format that would allow dual Beijing-Taipei membership of the new 
IGO. Before the launch of APEC, Beijing had insisted that members should be limited 
to sovereign states in order to keep Taiwan and Hong Kong out of the IGO. In July 
1990, Beijing reiterated the same stance. In the initial rounds of negotiations, 
however, Beijing gave consent to Taipei’s membership on condition that Taiwan 
would join APEC as a province of China. However, it eventually agreed to terms that 
would allow Taipei to become a member, yet terms that would not necessarily imply 
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that Taiwan was a province of China. Nonetheless, it still managed to prevent Taiwan 
from using its official designation and to limit the political presence of Taipei in 
APEC by ruling out the participation of its foreign minister and vice foreign minister. 
Arguably, China’s concessions had shown, as of the early 1990s, what Gary 
Klintworth describes as a growing Chinese tolerance of Taiwan’s new international 
role.76 
Beijing’s concessions can be partly explained by the strong economic and 
political incentives offered by APEC membership. In economic terms, as argued 
earlier, APEC attracted China because it could offer the country multiple benefits. 
First, APEC’s objective to push the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations 
would be in China’s interest as a growing trading power. According to a Chinese 
official, to join APEC agreed with Beijing’s outward-oriented economic reforms.77 
Second, China aspired to engage in this rule-making regional mechanism in order to 
create a predictable environment for its economic development.78  Finally, Beijing 
regarded its accession to APEC useful for its GATT membership. 
Politically, APEC’s attraction to Beijing was two-fold. First, the regime created a 
regional setting in which Beijing could pursue its bilateral diplomacy outside formal 
discussions. 79  After its admission to APEC in Seoul, for instance, the Chinese 
delegation met the Korean president Roh Tae Woo to discuss bilateral issues, paving 
the way for the Beijing-Seoul normalization in 1992. Second, accession served as a 
political asset to Beijing because it marked China’s return to the international 
community after Tiananmen. 
Taipei yielded mainly in the name and level of representation for its delegation to 
APEC. As illustrated above, even before the negotiations Taipei had recognized the 
external constraints imposed upon its pursuit of membership, thereby indicating its 
willingness to concede regarding its designation in APEC. Although Taipei put its 
official designation on the negotiation table, it was highly likely that Taipei knew that 
it would attend APEC using a different name. 
Taipei’s priority of joining APEC was clear from the outset. According to Chien, 
“There is a total consensus in the government that we should participate. The only 
concern is how we can minimize damage to our country. If we do not participate, it 
will violate our logic of pragmatic diplomacy.”80 
To achieve its objective of admission, Taipei was ready to make concessions 
considering the strong economic and political incentives offered by APEC. In 
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economic terms, APEC appealed to Taiwan for four reasons. First, APEC aimed at 
maintaining an open trading system thereby serving the economic interest of Taipei as 
an aggressive export maximizer. Second, accession would help Taipei manage its 
interdependence with the neighbouring countries. 81  Third, Taiwan shared APEC’s 
objective of economic liberalization. Fourth, Taiwan could use APEC to seek support 
for its GATT membership. 
In political terms, membership would create both symbolic and substantive gains 
for Taiwan because APEC would become the first IGO for Taipei to join since 1971, 
despite Chien’s claim that the main reason for Taiwan’s accession was “economic, not 
political” considerations.82  Symbolically speaking, the act of entering the first IGO 
since the inception of its contested statehood would enhance Taiwan’s official 
visibility and improve its international standing. More importantly, Taiwan could use 
the regime to promote its interests of “dual recognition”; by concurrently becoming a 
member together with the PRC, Taipei could seek de facto recognition of two separate 
political entities on each side of the Taiwan Strait among APEC members. After all, 
confirmed states could grant Taiwan, as a contested state, de facto recognition through 
participation in multilateral conferences with the latter.83 Besides, accession could 
help Taipei improve its political legitimacy at home by presenting the IGO 
membership to its domestic audience as a product of the success of its pragmatic 
diplomacy in response to the growing desire among its constituents for expanding 
Taiwan’s international space. As for substantive political gains, membership could 
enable Taiwan to establish high-level bilateral diplomatic channels with its 
neighbours, channels that had been largely blocked since 1971 because of its 
contested statehood.  
In sum, both political rivals, partly driven by perceived gains from their 
membership of APEC, put accession as the first priority, thereby making concessions 
over negotiations in order to achieve their top objective. 
 
Convergence of Interests among Actors Other Than Beijing and Taipei 
 
During the diplomatic process leading up to the first enlargement of APEC, the 
impact of what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye describe as “the multiple channels of 
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contacts among societies”84 became critical to Taipei’s accession. Besides the Chinese 
and Taiwanese officials, additional key players included Taiwanese business leaders, 
the Korean official mediator and American officials. Arguably, each player was driven 
by different interest calculations and it was the convergence of their interests that 
contributed to Taiwan’s accession. Since the converging interests of Taiwanese and 
Chinese state actors have already been analysed, this section will examine the 
convergence of interests among the Taiwanese non-state actors and the Korean and 
American state actors. 
First, Taiwanese business players utilized their private sector resources to 
facilitate Taipei’s accession because of their interest in breaking their country’s 
international isolation, which overlapped with that of the state. According to C.F. Koo, 
“There are many countries with which we do not have diplomatic relations, and in 
striving to join international organizations we must use the strengths of civil industry 
and business to influence representatives of each country and thus through them 
influence their governments.”85 These non-state actors utilized regional NGO settings 
to lobby for Taiwan’s entry and gathered information for Taipei. For instance, 
Taiwanese PECC members invited their NGO counterparts, especially those with 
influence on their governments, to Taipei to lobby for Taiwan’s membership.86 They 
also used their NGO connections to gain acceptance as Taipei’s unofficial 
representatives in dealing at the official level, illustrated by Koo’s attendance of the 
opening banquet of the inaugural meeting. 
As Lawrence T. Woods argues, “There is a possibility that NGOs may at times be 
better at performing tasks of interest to states than states themselves or IGOs.”87 
While the Taiwanese state actor found the utility of formal diplomatic channels 
lacking because of its position as a contested state, its societal actors better served the 
state interests by utilizing their private sector resources, thereby bypassing barriers in 
the formal channels. Hence, multiple channels engineered by Taiwanese economic 
elites helped the state actor in its bid to join APEC. During the process, official 
channels did function, illustrated by a Taiwanese diplomat’s low-profile presence in 
the surroundings of the inaugural meeting and later by the diplomatic negotiations. 
However, these official channels were supplemented by the unofficial ones, especially 
when the Taiwanese diplomat was excluded from the inaugural meeting. It was Koo 
that attended the opening banquet, whereas his official partner stayed outside the 
official gathering.  By utilizing his “unofficial” status as the PBEC representative at 
the banquet, Koo pursued the official interest of Taiwan – to be admitted to the IGO. 
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His unofficial status thus became blurred and yet his interest overlapped with that of 
his country. 
Second, Korea’s mediation was important to Taiwan’s membership and its 
success resulted from the special Taipei-Seoul-Beijing relationship and the well-
respected diplomatic skill of the leading Korean negotiator. Taipei-Seoul diplomatic 
channels were smoother than those between other APEC members and Taipei because 
South Korea was the only APEC country that still recognized Taiwan. Besides, Seoul 
was eager to normalize its relations with Beijing, making South Korea a less 
confrontational negotiating partner to China than the major APEC powers such as the 
US and Japan would have been. Seoul’s success was also due to the honed diplomatic 
skill of Lee. As Fauver commented, “his demonstrated objectivity in finding a 
solution was assumed to win the respect of parties negotiating the deal.”88 
It was Seoul’s perceived future interests that made it keen to conclude the 
negotiations. As the host of the 1991 meeting, Seoul saw the first enlargement, if 
achieved, as a way to enhance its international reputation.89 Besides, the process of 
negotiations would hopefully accelerate Seoul-Beijing normalization thereby 
contributing to its moves towards Nordpolitik due to strategic and economic 
interests. 90  The strategic calculation concerned the changing Seoul-Beijing-
Pyongyang relationship. In the mid-1980s, the second wave of East-West détente 
began to affect the Korean Peninsula resulting in a warming of ties between Seoul and 
Pyongyang.91 However, Seoul aspired to befriend Beijing and Moscow in order to 
gain the upper hand in dealing with Pyongyang. Seoul’s economic calculation was to 
deepen business relations with China through the pursuit of normalization following 
accelerating bilateral commercial links since the 1980s.92  
Although Lee stressed that he became the negotiator in his capacity as the chair 
of APEC SOM, not as a representative of Seoul, 93  the result of his endeavours 
benefited his government by bringing the Chinese delegation to Seoul, thereby 
facilitating bilateral high-level official meetings. The political returns to South Korea 
were later vindicated by the Seoul-Beijing joint communiqué on normalization on 24 
August 1992. 
Finally, the American support, driven by interest calculations, was conducive to 
the accession.94 In economic terms, the US saw the importance of including the three 
economies because of their strong regional links and their individual comparative 
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advantages which could be useful to other APEC members. Taiwan could especially 
share its experience in developing the small-and-medium enterprises (SMEs) with 
industrializing countries in APEC.95 
In strategic terms, Washington had three considerations. First, America intended 
to maintain a strategic balance within the region, so having one (China) without the 
other (Taiwan) would cause problems. “I think it (to exclude Taiwan from APEC) 
would have been unfortunate to the regional stability and development both 
economically and strategically,” admitted Fauver. Second, America remained behind 
the scenes while assisting Korea to work in the front for the enlargement in order to 
avoid a direct Sino-US confrontation.96 Third, America chose Korea as the “stalking 
horse” because of Seoul’s position as its reliable ally, and also because of its intention 
to assist Seoul in strengthening its ties with Beijing through the negotiation process. 
Because Seoul’s Nordpolitik was to move close to Beijing and Moscow so as to 
dominate relations with Pyongyang, this policy matched Washington’s strategic 
interest in establishing a counterforce against Pyongyang. Henceforth, America 
wished to help Korea become the mediator in order to move Seoul and Beijing 
together.97 
     
Creative Solutions Embodied in MOUs  
 
The creative solutions embodied in the MOUs finally led to Taiwan’s accession. 
“Chinese Taipei,” Taiwan’s designation in APEC, was creative because it offered 
ample room for respective interpretation by Taiwan and the Mainland. Both could 
choose to translate this English title for Taiwan into a different version of Mandarin 
Chinese to echo their respective interpretation of the status of Taipei. The PRC chose 
to call Taipei “Zhongguo Taibei 中国台北” because Zhongguo was the Mandarin 
Chinese abbreviation for the PRC, a move that reflected Beijing’s sovereignty claim 
over Taiwan. However, Taiwan chose to call itself “Chung-hua Taipei 中華台北” 
because Chung-hua was the abbreviation for the ROC. By doing so, Taipei could link 
its name in APEC to its official designation — at least in front of its Mandarin-
speaking constituents. 
Furthermore, three face-saving formulae were found for China in some parts of 
the MOUs, thereby ensuring Taiwan’s membership. First, the Taiwanese foreign 
minister should not attend APEC because China regarded the post as a symbol of 
Taipei’s political sovereignty. Second, the PRC-Korea MOU took note of Beijing’s 
position “that there is only one China,” which satisfied Beijing’s need to proclaim its 
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status as the sole legitimate government of China. Third, the same MOU noted that 
“distinction should be made between sovereign states and regional economies as a 
basis for the consultations.” These wordings reveal Beijing’s intention to define itself 
as a sovereign state and Taiwan as a non-state. Arguably, Beijing’s position was 
unilateral because the wording preceding such stance in the MOU was “taking note 
of,” instead of “accepting” or “recognizing.” Besides, APEC defined all members as 
economies, so no distinction should be made between sovereign states and regional 
economies. 98  As Fauver commented, “If China made its own stance, that’s fine. 
However, it had no standing in the group and in the official document of APEC.”99 
Nevertheless, these unilateral pronouncements helped make Taiwan’s accession 
possible.  
 
Conclusion  
 
To conclude, Taiwan’s APEC accession was an important yet under-studied 
breakthrough in the contested state’s struggle to break its international isolation which 
had lasted since 1971. The nuanced process leading up to this diplomatic watershed 
and the complex explanations of Taiwan’s success, as analysed above, demonstrate 
that the China factor does not single-handedly determine the timing and modalities of 
Taiwan’s IGO membership. In September 1991, Qian Qichen argued that Beijing had 
“taken the most flexible stance on the issue of Taiwan’s accession to APEC.”100 
However, such flexibility is not the only major factor accounting for Taipei’s 
membership, as detailed earlier. 
The accession has four positive effects on Taipei’s position as a contested state. 
First, Taiwan’s de facto recognition as a state has become consolidated since 1991 
because of confirmed states’ participation in APEC along with the Taipei delegation, 
although Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty has not necessarily improved 
accordingly. Second, APEC membership has enabled Taipei to engage in international 
cooperation with member economies on a wide range of issues, including narrowing 
the digital divide among members, anti-terrorism, and capacity building for SMEs. 
Consequently, Taiwanese officials101 have worked with their counterparts to deal with 
pertinent transnational issues, and these deepening inter-governmental linkages are 
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key assets for Taiwan as a contested state. Third, APEC accession has helped Taipei 
mitigate its legitimacy concerns at home stemming from its thwarted status as a 
normal state. For instance, the image of an envoy representing Taiwan’s president side 
by side with other heads of state during the annual APEC summit, a practice 
established since 1993,102 has sent a powerful message to Taiwanese constituents that 
Taipei is not absent from this regional summit, albeit not on an equal footing with its 
regional counterparts. As a senior Taiwanese diplomat insists, APEC membership 
makes Taiwanese constituents feel that their country “exists” on the international 
stage.103 Fourth, APEC accession has enabled Taiwan to continuously advance its 
interests through the conduct of bilateral diplomacy outside the formal meetings. For 
instance, outside the 1991 meeting, Taiwan made its first official contact with Japan at 
a ministerial level since Tokyo severed ties with Taipei in 1971. 
As for the major implications of the study for Taiwan’s continuous struggle as a 
contested state, the study shows that many external actors have facilitated Taipei’s 
accession, thereby challenging Beijing’s delineation of the Taiwan issue as an 
“internal” affair. For its future IGO memberships, Taipei should avoid any unqualified 
reliance on negotiations with Beijing because it may reinforce Beijing’s 
aforementioned claim regarding Taiwan. 104  However, China’s increasing power 
implies that Taiwan’s struggle to expand its contested statehood will deepen. Even so, 
overt dependence on Beijing’s good will to break isolation is insufficient. Taiwan 
should also ensure that the functioning of economic statecraft and the conduct of 
sophisticated diplomacy in various major capitals through multiple channels will 
continually be in place, using favourable external and internal conditions to its 
advantage as they rise.105  
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